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Nuclear security practices have been a part of the development of China’s nuclear industry from 
the beginning, and they remain an important part of nuclear operations. The Chinese government 
pays close attention to nuclear security and has set up laws and regulations to govern the use of 
nuclear materials. The companies and operators that use nuclear materials have developed 
operational manuals and regulations to ensure the protection and control of nuclear materials 
based on national laws and regulations. These measures explain why there are no reported losses 
of nuclear materials from Chinese facilities. In light of recent reforms and the “opening” of 
China, which has increased communication with foreigners and has led to other changes in the 
international environment, threats to nuclear material security are changing and posing new 
challenges to Chinese nuclear management. The Chinese government is working to improve 
regulations to confront these new threats.  
Nuclear material accounting is one of the most important parts of nuclear material security. 
China has set up a nuclear material accounting system to account for nuclear materials, to track 
material inventories, to report inventory changes, and to help detect unexpected increases or 
decreases in inventories. This paper analyzes Chinese nuclear material accounting systems and 






China developed nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s in direct response to other states’ 
development of nuclear weapons. Chinese leaders believed that nuclear weapons should not be 
used as tools of war and can only be used to deter other states from using nuclear weapons 
against China. As such, China also limited its development of nuclear power. 
At the time, states primarily developed their domestic nuclear industries in support of military 
purposes. For both economic and technical reasons, China adopted the policy of “no-first-use” of 
nuclear weapons, which has restrained Chinese production of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
materials. Former Chinese leader Zhou Enlai once instructed the leaders of China’s nuclear 
weapons development complex to pay great attention to their work and to not waste money, as 
the weapons were to be destroyed in the future. Chinese stockpiles of nuclear materials for use in 
nuclear weapons are small, just large enough to defend Chinese national security.  
China has also always opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In a 1984 report, former 
Premier Zhao Ziyang reiterated the government’s stance that China would not participate in the 
“discriminatory” Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but that it “does not advocate nuclear 
proliferation, nor engage in nuclear proliferation, not helping other countries to develop nuclear 
weapons.” 
 
Chinese nuclear materials management and IAEA safeguards 
China’s nuclear industry is highly centralized and led by the state. Special government 
committees make decisions relevant to the industry, and assigned tasks and requests rely 
primarily on various administrative departments.  
During the early development of China’s nuclear industry, some major powers imposed a 
blockade on trade to China and adopted repressive policies; this nearly shut down the industry. 
Starting in 1978, international cooperation on China’s nuclear industry entered a new period of 
development. As it adjusted its foreign policy, China took a more flexible attitude to the 
international safeguard system that prevailed globally. In 1984, China become a formal member 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and in 1986, China participated in the 
development of and signed the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 
Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. In 
September 1988, China and the IAEA formally signed a voluntary offer safeguards agreement 
(“Agreement of the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for 
the Application of Safeguards in China”) and submitted a list of nuclear facilities to make 
available for safeguards. The IAEA currently conducts inspection activities at the Qinshan 




To improve its technical capacity to implement safeguards on nuclear materials, China 
subsequently signed onto a series of international agreements and commitments: In December 
1988, it signed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); on 
June 22, 1990, China signed a technical assistance agreement with the IAEA; in September 
1994, China signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety; in December 1998, China agreed to an 
IAEA Additional Protocol, which entered into force on March 28 2002; in April 2006, China’s 
acceded to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management; and in September 2009, China approved the amendment to the 
CPPNM. 
China also enacted a series of domestic policies and regulations to secure nuclear materials and 
reinforce its commitment to nonproliferation. In May 1996, China declared that it would not 
export nuclear technology or otherwise assist foreign nuclear facilities until they were put under 
IAEA safeguards. In support of this pledge, in September 1997, the Chinese government 
promulgated new export control regulations, “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
Nuclear Export Control.” China maintains a licensing system for nuclear exports and a nuclear 
export control list that is similar to the generally accepted international nuclear export control 
list. On November 9, 2006, China’s State Council issued Order No. 480, which codified and 
refined the state export control system. On June 10, 1998, China also promulgated an ordinance 
on export controls for nuclear dual-use items and related technologies. Nearly a decade later, on 
January 26, 2007, the State Council issued Order No. 484, which amended the ordinance. 
On August 16, 2010, China and the IAEA signed a nuclear security cooperation agreement to 
develop a China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA)/ IAEA Joint Training Center with the goal of 
strengthening nuclear security domestically and globally. The center is meant to promote the 
implementation of the CPPNM and its amendment, and to support the promotion, translation, 
and publication of a new series of reports on nuclear security and cooperation. Building on the 
nuclear security cooperation that preceded the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the center also aimed to 
strengthen cooperation on the development of regulations and standards for nuclear security 
broadly defined and for nuclear security at large public events, and to build domestic capacity to 
implement nuclear security goals and train personnel. In collaboration with the United States, 
China also established the National Nuclear Security Technology Center, which builds off of 
Sino-U.S. cooperation on “centers of excellence.”  
In March 2012, President Hu Jintao attended the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. At the summit, 
he reiterated China’s comprehensive nuclear security policies and initiatives, and expressed 






Chinese nuclear material accounting 
In 1987, China’s State Council promulgated a nuclear material control ordinance that established 
a relatively complete national nuclear material control system to ensure the safety and security of 
legitimate-use nuclear materials. The ordinance outlines the scope of a material management and 
licensing system and determines the responsibilities and basic requirements for government and 
commercial units that hold nuclear materials. 
China’s system for nuclear material management includes a licensing system, reporting systems, 
and an inspection system. On September 25, 1990, the Chinese government issued a document, 
“Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations on Nuclear Materias Control,” which defined 
the responsibility of the Office of Nuclear Material Management, the responsibility of units 
licensed to hold nuclear materials, the procedures for applying for such licenses, the basic 
nuclear material accounting requirements, the hierarchical structure of nuclear materials 
management, and the corresponding physical protection requirements. 
Specific nuclear material control and accounting requirements are based primarily on the 
“Implementation Details” of the nuclear material control ordinance, which was enacted in 1990. 
These requirements are necessary to ensure the national interest and law, to guarantee the 
security of the country and the people, and to ensure national control of nuclear materials. If 
necessary, the state can expropriate all nuclear material.  
The main purpose of nuclear material control and accounting is to detect the loss or theft of 
nuclear material, to prevent the illegal transfer and illegal use of nuclear material, and to ensure 
the security of nuclear material. Chinese nuclear material accounting systems require that a 
facility establish a full-time or designated person to be responsible for the custody of nuclear 
materials. They also require strict procedures for the handover of those materials from person to 
person, the establishment of accounting and reporting systems, and for balancing the material 
accounting books. Nuclear material accounting relies on measurement systems that use approved 
analytical methods and measurement standards. These are necessary to meet balance error 
requirements and to maintain nuclear material balances. 
Entities that hold nuclear material licenses are required to establish original records for materials 
under their control and enter them into a reporting system. These records need to be clear, 
correct, systematic, and complete, and they must be maintained for at least five years. These 
records include measurements of opening and closing stocks, logs of internal transfers, and dates 
when materials were input or output from stockpiles. Each licensed entity establishes its own 
format for recording its statistics, statistical procedures, and internal audit systems, according to 
the characteristics of their materials and operations. Material custodians are also in charge of 
maintaining the records for the nuclear material under their supervision.  
If the quantity of a nuclear material at a facility is less than the specified limit, the Chinese 
government does not require the acquisition of nuclear material licenses, but those facilities must 
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register their nuclear material with authorities. When these materials are transferred or re-
transferred, these facilities must complete "transfer of nuclear material” reports. Units that 
produce nuclear materials but are not registered must also fill out these reports and make known 
the variety and quantity of their sales.  
When establishing a nuclear material accounting system, license holders designate material 
balance areas according to facility characteristics. Accounting requirements depend on the 
classification of nuclear material. Each balance area needs to account for all materials within its 
purview, and personnel within each area should implement material accounting requirements 
independently. License holders need to conduct physical inventories of nuclear materials within 
balance areas at least annually. Physical inventories are conducted at least twice annually for 
specific materials—Plutonium 239, Uranium with an abundance of Uranium 233 or with 
Uranium 235 in concentrations greater than 20 percent, and other nuclear materials. To fulfill 
this requirement, license holders need to develop physical inventory plans and work programs. 
In order to ensure that a physical inventory is accurate and reliable, operators are expected to: 
take inventories of materials according to material types and physical-chemical forms; base 
inventories on measured values; develop strict measures to ensure the integrity of in-process 
inventories; and measure nuclear material content in waste gasses, waste water, and chemical 
waste. Measurement systems used in nuclear material accounting are expected to be accurate 
enough to meet stipulated requirements. The systems are expected to provide accurate data about 
the nuclear material transceiver, inventory losses, and material balances. Measurement errors 
should be analyzed, and the reliability of measurement systems should be regularly assessed. 
This involves maintaining standard materials and standard sources, rules for sample preparation, 
methods for instrument calibration and measurement, requirements for data and records, and the 
ability to evaluate statistical processing and errors. 
When material accounting records contain material unaccounted for (MUF) greater than two  
times the standard error, operators are required to keep open the material balance for a given 
area. This MUF could mean a nuclear material loss, theft, or illegal transfer. In response to such 
a situation, the accountancy unit needs to evaluate the error of the measurement system and 
calculate the actual measurement error of MUF. When the results of calculations exceed the limit 
standard, accounting units are expected to improve analytical measurement systems. 
Accountancy officials should regularly evaluate inventory records and the integrity of material 
items. They should analyze material balances, including transceiver differences and explanations 
for MUF produced. Changes in physical inventories and changes of morphology should be 
reported. Officials also need to calibrate and verify measurement systems, and license holders 
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